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Abstract
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dy-
namics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This
equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games,
such as the Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove and Coordination games, and
to the Ultimatum Game. In the latter case, we find that adding even a
small mutation term to the replicator equation leads to a solution where
the average offer is significantly larger than zero.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game dynamics is a fast developing field, with applications in biol-
ogy, economics, sociology and anthropology. Background material and countless
references can be found in the monographs by Weibull [1], Fudenburg & Levine
[2], Samuelson [3], Hofbauer & Sigmund [4], Gintis [5], Cressman [6] and Vincent
& Brown [7] or in the survey paper by Hofbauer & Sigmund [8]. The standard
ingredients of evolutionary game dynamics are a population of players, an n-
person game, a set of strategies and a rule to update the distribution of strategies
from one generation to the next. Within this general setting several variations
are possible: time can be discrete or continuous, populations can be finite or
infinite, the game can have a finite or infinite number of strategies. Also, there
are several choices for the updating rule, the most popular of which are Adap-
tive Dynamics (See e.g. Diekmann [9]) and Replicator Dynamics, introduced
by Taylor & Jonker [10]. In this paper we consider a model with continuous
time, an infinite population and a 2-person game, where each participant has a
continuum of strategies to choose from. The update rule we use is the replicator
dynamics, with deterministic mutations. Although this model has been alluded
to by Dieckmann [11], where a hierarchy of evolutionary models is presented,
its details have not been worked out before.
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The strategy space that we consider is a subset of Rn, which in all appli-
cations is compact. In section 2 we first consider replicator dynamics with a
deterministic mutation term on a finite set of strategies. Using a procedure that
is familiar in Statistical Mechanics, we make a transition to an infinite, contin-
uous, strategy-space. The state-space of the model is then no longer discrete,
but consists of distributions over the strategies. We derive a partial differential
equation, together with appropriate boundary conditions, that describes the
time-evolution of this distribution, given an initial distribution. Without the
mutation term, the equation we derive was previously studied by Cressman [14]
and Oechsler & Riedel [15]. Our addition of a mutation term is new and leads
to completely different dynamics.
In section 3, the equation is applied to symmetric 2x2 games, where we need
to extend the original two-strategy set to a continuous one. This can be done
by allowing for strategies that play one of the pure strategies with a certain
probability. We compare our results with those of Vaughan [16], who analyses
the replicator dynamics for the pure strategies, to which a stochastic perturba-
tion term is added, leading to a Fokker-Planck equation. There are similarities
between the two models, but also striking differences. In the stochastic muta-
tion version, there is always only one attracting, stationary, distribution, which
for small mutations converges to a point-distribution (Dirac-delta function). In
other words, all players eventually use the same strategy. In the deterministic
mutation version, however, we find the possibility of two attracting stationary
distributions existing simultaneously. Also, in certain cases the limiting distri-
bution for small mutations is not concentrated on a point, but has the whole
strategy space as support.
A more complicated example, namely the Ultimatum Game, is treated in
section 4. In this game, a sum of money is to be split by two players. The first
player proposes the split and the second player then has the choice to accept the
split or refuse, in which case both players get nothing. The solution offered by
standard game theory is for the second player to accept any amount (something
is always better than nothing) and for the first player, therefore, to offer the
lowest possible amount. In our model we find that the offers converge to a
Gauss-like distribution around a mean that is not equal to zero. The position of
the mean and the width of the distribution seem to converge to zero when the
rate of mutation vanishes. However, this convergenge is slow, so that even for
very small values of the mutation rate, the average offer is well above zero. Also,
the dynamics shows two time-scales. A random starting distribution is initially
attracted to a member of a certain set of distributions, which can have an average
offer much larger than zero. Then, on a time-scale inversely proportional to the
rate of mutation, the solution converges to the, unique, stationary solution.
In section 5 we discuss the results and suggest some topics for further re-
search.
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2 From the discrete to the continuous equation
The equation for the replicator dynamics with continuous strategy space will be
derived by a limiting process, starting from the equations for the discrete case.
Following Hofbauer and Sigmund [4], we consider an infinite population of
players and a set of strategies S1, · · · , SN . When a player A opts for strategy
Si against B, who uses Sj , the payoff to A is taken to be Mij , and the payoff to
B is Mji. Consequently, if pj(t) is the fraction of the whole population that at
time t plays the strategy Sj , the average payoff to each player using Si is equal
to
Πi(p) ≡
N∑
j=1
Mijpj . (1)
The average payoff for the whole population therefore is
Π(p) =
N∑
i=1
Πi(p)pi =
N∑
i,j=1
piMijpj . (2)
Now in the course of time, the fraction pi changes at a rate which is proportional
to the difference between the payoff to pi and the average payoff for the whole
population. In addition we assume that for each player of Sj there is a transition
probability per unit time to make a spontaneous transfer to strategy Si at a
rate given by Wij . In this way the discrete replicator equation with mutation is
derived:
p˙i = (Πi(p) −Π(p))pi +
N∑
j=1
(Wijpj −Wjipi). (3)
It is easy to show that S(t) ≡
N∑
i=1
pi(t) = 1 for all t if S(0) = 1.
In transforming to a continous strategy space, we replace the discrete index
i by a continuous variable s ∈ D ⊂ Rn and the variables pi(t) by a probability
distribution P (s, t). The payoff matrix Mij must now be replaced by a payoff
function M(s, s′), which gives the payoff to strategy s when playing strategy s′.
Eq.(3) now takes the form
∂P (s, t)
∂t
= (Π(s, P ) −Π(P ))P (s, t) +M(P, s) (4)
in which the mutation term is equal to
M(P, s) =
∫
[W (s|s′)P (s′, t)−W (s′|s)P (s, t)] ds′. (5)
The average payoff for strategy s and the total average payoff are given by
Π(s, P ) =
∫
M(s, s′)P (s′, t) ds′ (6)
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and
Π(P ) =
∫
Π(s, P )P (s, t) ds. (7)
Let us now restrict ourselves to mutations in which only small changes in the
strategies occur and apply the method which is used to derive the Fokker-Planck
equation from a master equation [12]. For simplicity of presentation, we restrict
ourselves to the case of a one-dimensional strategy space. Define ξ by s′ = s− ξ
and write the mutation rate as a function of s and ξ
W (s′|s) = W˜ (s, s− s′) = W˜ (s, ξ) (8)
and so
W (s|s′) = W˜ (s′, s′ − s) = W˜ (s− ξ,−ξ). (9)
Assume now that W˜ (s, ξ) varies slowly in the first variable s and that due to
the mutations only small variations in the strategies will occur. Then W˜ (s, ξ)
is only nonvanishing when ξ is small. In the mutation term (5), which can be
written as
M(P, s) =
∫
[W˜ (s− ξ,−ξ)P (s− ξ, t)− W˜ (s, ξ)P (s, t)] dξ, (10)
we can now expand the dependence on the first variable in powers of ξ and
obtain
M(P, s) =
∫
[W˜ (s,−ξ)P (s, t)− ξ
∂
∂s
{W˜ (s,−ξ)P (s, t)} + (11)
+
1
2
ξ2
∂2
∂s2
{W˜ (s,−ξ)P (s, t)}+ · · · − W˜ (s, ξ)P (s, t)] dξ.
Because
∫
[W˜ (s,−ξ) − W˜ (s, ξ)]P (s, t)dξ = 0, the first and last term cancel, so
that to second order we are left with
M(P, s) =
∂
∂s
{α1(s)P (s, t)} +
1
2
∂2
∂s2
{α2(s)P (s, t)}, (12)
in which
α1(s) = −
∫
ξW˜ (s, ξ) dξ and α2(s) =
∫
ξ2W˜ (s, ξ) dξ. (13)
We will further simplify the equations by assuming that the average change in
strategy due to mutations is equal to zero, so α1(s) = 0, and that the average
of the square of this change is constant, so α2(s) = 2σ.
The final form of the continuous replicator equation (4) then becomes
∂P (s, t)
∂t
= (Π(s, P (t))−Π(P (t)))P (s, t) + σ∆P (s, t), (14)
where we have restored the correct dimensionality of the strategy space by
replacing ∂
2
∂s2 by the n-dimensional Laplace operator. P (s, t) should satisfy
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P (s, t) ≥ 0 and S(t) ≡
∫
D
P (s, t) ds, should be equal to unity at all times. This
last condition is fulfilled when we choose Neumann, or reflecting, boundary
conditions:
n.∇P (s, t)|∂D = 0, (15)
where n is the normal to the boundary ∂D of the domain D.
Indeed, integrating (14) over D and using (15) we find
dS(t)
dt
= Π(P )(1 − S(t)), (16)
showing that if S(0) = 1 then S(t) = 1 for all times. In the case that σ = 0,
condition (15) is not required to ensure that S(t) remain constant in time.
Equation (14) is a nonlinear reaction-diffusion equation, where the reac-
tion term Π(s, P (t)) − Π(P (t)) is nonlocal. On the function space of twice
continuous space-differentiable and once time-differentiable functions, we can
show that the solution of (14) exists for all times. This follows from the as-
sumption that M(s, s′) is bounded on D, so that
∣∣Π(s, P (t))−Π(P (t))∣∣ ≤∫
D×D
|M(s, s′)|P (s, t)P (s′, t) ds ds′ +
∫
D
|M(s, s′)|P (s′, t) ds′ ≤
max |M(s, s′)|
{∫
D×D
P (s, t)P (s′, t) ds ds′ +
∫
D
P (s′, t) ds′
}
= 2max |M(s, s′)|.
Standard comparison theorems for parabolic equations (Pao [13]) complete
the proof. Also, by standard positivity results for parabolic equations, it can
be shown that the when the initial distribution P (s, 0) ≥ 0, then P (s, t) ≥ 0 for
all times t.
Numerical simulations suggest that even stronger results hold. In particu-
lar, we suspect that the solution of Eqs.(14), (15) is uniformly (in space and
time) bounded in terms of the sup-norm of the initial distribution. For one-
dimensional strategy spaces, we speculate that the solution will always converge
to a stationary solution.
For σ = 0, Eq.(14) has been studied by Cressman [14] and Oechsler & Riedel
[15]. They show that Eq.(14) has a unique solution, for all times, on a large
space of distributions, containing amongst others the Dirac-delta distributions.
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3 Symmetric 2x2 games
In symmetric 2 × 2 games there are two possible strategies, denoted by I and
II. The payoff to player A is given by the payoff matrix
M=
A\B I II
I a b
II c d
.
3.1 Discrete replicator dynamics
The discrete replicator dynamics associated with this game consists of an infinite
population where a fraction x1(t) plays the pure strategy I and a a fraction x2(t)
plays the pure strategy II . The payoffs to strategies I and II are given by:
ΠI(x1, x2) = ax1 + bx2 and ΠII(x1, x2) = cx1 + dx2. (17)
The average payoff to the total population is then
Π(x1, x2) = ΠI(x1, x2)x1 +ΠII(x1, x2)x2 = ax
2
1 + (b + c)x1x2 + dx
2
2. (18)
With a mutation rate matrix of the form W = σ
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σ > 0 and using
x1(t) + x2(t) = 1, this leads to the following equation for x1(t) :
x˙1 = x1(1− x1)(B + (A−B)x1) + σ(1− 2x1), (19)
where A = a − c and B = b − d. The solutions of Eq.(19) for σ = 0 are
summarised in figure 1.
A
B
III
III IV
Figure 1: The four quadrants of the parameter space
A typical example of a game in the quadrant A > 0, B > 0 is the classic
Prisoners Dilemma, where a = 1, b = 5, c = 0, d = 3. The strategy I corresponds
to ’defect’ and strategy II to ’cooperate’. Figure 1 shows that for σ = 0 the
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discrete replicator dynamics Eq.(19) predicts a final outcome of x1 = 1, x2 = 0,
or ’All Defect’. The effect of the mutation is to shift the stable solution to a
slightly lower value of x1.
The Hawk-Dove game (also known as Chicken) has a = (G − C)/2, b =
G, c = 0, d = G/2, where now strategy I corresponds to ’hawk’ (or ’never back
down’) and II to ’dove’ (’allways back down’). When the cost C to the loser of
a hawk-hawk fight is larger than the gain G a hawk makes when confronting a
dove, we have A < 0, B > 0. It follows from Eq.(19) that for σ = 0 the solution
tends to the stable equilibrium x1 = B/(B−A) = G/C, describing a population
where the strategies co-exist. Also in this case, the effect of the mutation term
is restricted to a small shift in the location of the stable equilibrium.
The quadrant with A > 0, B < 0 is the domain of the Coordination Games,
exemplified by the situation a = 2, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1. In a Coordination Game
it is advantageous for both players to play the same strategy. In a 2× 2 game,
this leads to two equilibria. Note, however, that in the example mentioned here
the situation where both play strategy I is superior to the one where both play
II. For σ = 0 there are two stable solutions and one unstable one, and the
final outcome depends on the initial situation. When x1(0) <
1
3 the solution
will ultimately tend to x1 = 0, otherwise to x1 = 1. In other words, when the
initial fraction of strategy I players is too small, the final population will consist
exclusively of strategy II players, even though this is the less attractive of the
two equilibria.
In the case of Coordination Games, the effect of mutation can qualitatively
change this picture. With the above given values of a, b, c and d, we have plotted
the right-hand side of Eq.(19) for several values of σ. (figure 2).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.1
-0.05
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Figure 2: The bifurcation property of Eq.(19)
From this picture it follows that for values of σ larger than a critical value
σc (in this example σc ≈ 0.11) the only equilibrium left is the optimal one near
x1 = 1, which is also the globally attracting solution.
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3.2 Discrete replicator dynamics with a stochastic term
In [16], Eq.(19) is studied, where instead of a deterministic mutation term, a
small noise term is added. This leads to the stochastic equation:
dx = G(x)dt + 2σ dW, (20)
where G(x) = x(1−x)(B+(A−B)x) and W (t) denotes a Wiener process with
zero mean and unit variance.
In this model, the mutation from one strategy to another does not happen at
a fixed rate, as in the model described by Eq.(19), but rather the fraction x1(t)
is changed by a small random amount per time-step. To describe the outcome
of Eq.(20), we consider the evolution of the probability density f(x, t). The
probability that at time t the fraction of strategy I players lies in the interval
[x, x+∆x] is given by f(x, t)∆x. The equation for f(x, t) is the Fokker-Planck
equation [12]:
∂f(x, t)
∂t
= −
∂
∂x
(G(x)f(x, t)) + σ
∂2f(x, t)
∂x2
. (21)
We assume reflecting boundaries, which yield as boundary conditions:
∂f(x = 0, t)
∂x
=
∂f(x = 1, t)
∂x
= 0. (22)
Eq.(21) with conditions (22) has a unique, attracting, stationary distribution
f∗(x) [16].
It is easy to see that this equilibrium distribution is given by
f∗(x) = C exp(
1
σ
∫ x
0
G(x′) dx′), (23)
where the constant C is determined by the condition
∫ 1
0 f
∗(x)dx = 1.
Differentiating f∗(x) once yields
df∗(x)
dx
=
C
σ
G(x) exp(
1
σ
∫ x
0
G(x′) dx′), (24)
from which it follows that the extrema of f∗(x) are the zeroes of G(x), which are
the equilibria of the discrete replicator equation (19) with σ = 0. Differentiating
once more gives
d2f∗(x)
dx2
=
C
σ
(G′(x) +
G2(x)
σ
) exp(
1
σ
∫ x
0
G(x′) dx′), (25)
so at an equilibrium point xe we have that
d2f∗(x=xe)
dx2 = KG
′(xe) with K > 0.
Therefore, a stable equilibrium of Eq.(19) with σ = 0 corresponds to a maximum
of f∗(x), and an unstable equilibrium to a minimum.
In the limit σ → 0, the stationary distribution f∗(x) will tend to a point-
distribution, where the total probability is concentrated on one point. In the
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case of the Hawk-Dove Game and the Prisoners Dilemma it is clear that this
point-distribution is concentrated on the unique stable equilibrium of the corre-
sponding discrete replicator equation. For Coordination Games, there are two
stable equilibria in the discrete case. Correspondingly, the stationary distri-
bution has two local maximuma, namely at x = 0 and at x = 1. In [16] it
is proved that for σ → 0 one of these two maxima will eventually dominate.
The equilibrium that finally emerges is the one which has the largest basin of
attraction in the discrete case, and is known in the game-theory literature as
the risk-dominant equilibrium.
3.3 Continuous replicator dynamics
The two strategy set of 2× 2 games can be extended to a continuum of strate-
gies, each of which indicated by a real number x ǫ [0, 1]. For the payoff function
M(x, x′) we choose a simple interpolation between the four payoff values of the
symmetric 2× 2 game:
M(x, x′) = xx′a+ x(1 − x′)b + (1− x)x′c+ (1− x)(1 − x′)d. (26)
This game can be considered as the underlying discrete 2×2 game where now
mixed strategies are allowed, in the following sense. A strategy xǫ[0, 1] means
that the player will use pure strategy I with probability x. We now assume
that two players, using strategies x and x′ respectively, at one encounter play
each other a large number of times. Eq.(26) then gives the expectation value
of the payoff to the first player. Because our players will soon become aware of
the Law of Large Numbers, they won’t bother with playing against each other,
but at an encounter simply settle for the payoff given by Eq.(26), making this
a deterministic game.
The expressions for Π(x, P ) and Π(P ) are easy to calculate:
Π(x, P ) =
∫ 1
0
M(x, x′)P (x′, t) dx
=
∫ 1
0
(xx′a+ x(1 − x′)b + (1− x)x′c+ (1− x)(1 − x′)d)P (x′, t) dx′
= d+ (b− d)x+ (c− d)x(t) + (a− b− c+ d)xx(t)
in which
x(t) =
∫ 1
0
xP (x, t) dx (27)
is the average strategy. Then
Π(P ) =
∫ 1
0
Π(x, P )P (x, t) dx =
= d+ (b+ c− 2d)x(t) + (a− b− c+ d)x2(t),
9
and
Π(x, P )−Π(P ) = (b − d)x− (b − d)x(t) + (a− b− c+ d)(xx(t)− x2(t))
= (B + (A−B)x(t))(x − x(t)), (28)
where A and B are the same parameters as defined in section 3.1.
Eq.(14) for P (x, t) now becomes:
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= (B + (A−B)x(t))(x − x(t))P (x, t) + σ
∂2P (x, t)
∂x2
, (29)
with boundary conditions:(
∂P (x, t)
∂x
)
x=0
=
(
∂P (x, t)
∂x
)
x=1
= 0, (30)
and an intial distribution P (x, 0).
3.3.1 The equation without mutation
As was noted before, when considering Eq.(29) without mutation, i.e. with
σ = 0, it is not necessary to impose the boundary conditions (30) in order to
ensure that
∫ 1
0 P (x, t) dx remain constant. In [14] it is shown that
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= (B + (A−B)x(t))(x − x(t))P (x, t), P (x, 0) = P0(x) (31)
has a unique solution for all t > 0. In this subsection we will analyse the
asymptotic behaviour of the solution of Eq.(31) as t→∞.
Firstly, the equation for the average x(t) is given by:
dx
dt
= (B + (A−B)x(t))(x2(t)− (x(t))2), x(0) =
∫ 1
0
xP0(x)dx, (32)
where x2(t) =
∫ 1
0 x
2P (x, t)dx. The factor x2(t)− (x(t))2 is always positive. For
the four different regions of the (A,B) parameter plane, as illustrated in figure
1, Eq.(32) implies the following.
(A,B) ∈ I: in this case (B + (A − B)x(t)) > 0 for all t, so x(t) is an in-
creasing function. Because P (x, t) = 0 for x /∈ [0, 1], the distribution will
accumulate at x = 1 and limt→∞ x(t) = 1.
(A,B) ∈ II: Eq.(32) now has an attractive fixed point at x = B/(B − A).
Therefore, limt→∞ x(t) = B/(B −A)
(A,B) ∈ III: similar to I, but now limt→∞ x(t) = 0.
(A,B) ∈ IV :Eq.(32) has a repelling fixed point at x = B/(B −A). It follows
that limt→∞ x(t) = 0 if x(0) < B/(B −A) and limt→∞ x(t) = 1 if x(0) >
B/(B −A).
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In the cases I, III and IV the limiting distributions P∞(x) = limt→∞ P (x, t)
are point-distributions concentrated on one of the endpoints of the domain [0, 1].
This is comparable with the results in the model described in section 3.2 when
σ → 0: eventually all players will play either one or the other of the pure
strategies. The situation is quite different for case II, i.e. for Hawk-Dove
type games. We will show that in this case, P∞(x) depends on the initial
condition P0(x), but is in general non-zero on all of [0, 1]. This is a dramatic
difference with the above mentioned model. There, the population is divided
into a fraction B/(B − A) of the population who play pure strategy I and the
rest who play strategy II. In our model, where the players have access to a
continuum of mixed strategies, we do not find that everybody plays the mixed
strategy x = B/(B−A) (play strategy I with probability B/(B−A)), as might
be expected. Rather, the final outcome is a population who’s members play a
broad range of strategies, although the average value of the strategies played is
x = B/(B −A). The details are as follows.
Every distribution P (x) with
∫ 1
0
xP (x) dx = x = B/(B−A) is a solution of
Eq.(31). We will now show that this set of distributions is attractive.
Let λ(t) = (B + (A−B)x(t)). The solution of Eq.(31) then is
P (x, t) = P0(x) exp(
∫ t
0
λ(t′)(x− x(t′)) dt. (33)
Using
∫ 1
0 P (x, t)dx = 1 and writing g(t) =
∫ t
0 λ(t
′)dt, it follows that
exp(
∫ t
0
λ(t′)x(t′)dt) =
∫ 1
0
P0(x) e
xg(t) dx. (34)
Therefore
P (x, t) =
P0(x) e
xg(t)∫ 1
0
P0(x) exg(t) dx
. (35)
Differentiating relation (34) with respect to t yields
λ(t)x(t) exp(
∫ t
0
λ(t′)x(t′) dt) = g′(t)
∫ 1
0
xP0(x) e
xg(t) dx.
Using g′(t) = λ(t), and Eq.(34), this reduces to
x(t) =
∫ 1
0
xP0(x) e
xg(t) dx∫ 1
0
P0(x) exg(t) dx
. (36)
Since limt→∞ x(t) = B/(B − A), then g(t) =
∫ t
0
(B + (A − B)x(t′)) dt′ either
tends to a finite limit or diverges. Using the change of variable u = x g(t), we
can write:
x(t) =
1
g(t)
∫ g(t)
0
uP0(
u
g(t) ) e
u du∫ g(t)
0 P0(
u
g(t) ) e
u du
.
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Therefore, when g(t)→∞, then
x(t) = lim
ε↓0
ε
∫ 1/ε
0
uP0(εu) e
u du∫ 1/ε
0 P0(εu) e
u du
= lim
ε↓0
ε
∫ 1/ε
0
u eu du∫ 1/ε
0 e
u du
= 1.
By a similar argument, when g(t) → −∞ then x(t) → 0. Since limt→∞ x(t) =
B/(B−A) is neither 0 nor 1, it follows that limt→∞ g(t) = g0 is finite. Therefore,
as t→∞ the solution Eq.(35) tends to
P∞(x) =
P0(x) e
xg0∫ 1
0
P0(x) exg0 dx
,
which is clearly not a point-distribution.
The value of g0 can be found from Eq.(36), which in the limit t→∞ reads:
B
B −A
=
∫ 1
0
xP0(x) e
xg0 dx∫ 1
0 P0(x) e
xg0 dx
.
This equation for g0 can be solved numerically for given values of A and B and
a given initial distribution P0(x). In figure 3, two examples, both with A = −3
and B = 7, are given for different initial distributions, shown in the left column.
In the right column the final distributions are plotted.
1 1
1 1
Figure 3: Initial and final distributions without mutations
3.3.2 Stationary solutions of the full equation
Numerical experiments show that all solutions of the full equation (29) converge
to a time-independent solution. The equation for these stationary solutions is
given by:
σ
d2P (x)
dx2
+ (B + (A−B)x)(x− x)P (x) = 0, (37)
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P ′(0) = P ′(1) = 0, P (x) ≥ 0,
∫ 1
0
P (x) dx = 1. (38)
Rather than giving a definition of x in terms of P (x), we take x to be a free
parameter and impose the conditions (38). Integrating Eq. (37) over x from 0
to 1 then yields:
(B + (A−B)x)(
∫ 1
0
xP (x) dx − x) = 0. (39)
Assuming that B + (A−B)x 6= 0, the equality
x =
∫ 1
0
xP (x) dx. (40)
then follows automatically.
Let s(x) = sign(B+(A−B)x) and κ(x) = |B+(A−B)xσ |
1/3. Then the solution
of Eq. (37) is given by:
P (x) = aAi[−s(x)κ(x)(x− x)] + bBi[−s(x)κ(x)(x− x)], (41)
where the Airy functions Ai(z) and Bi(z) are the standard linearly independent
solutions of y′′(z)− zy(z) = 0. These functions are plotted in figure 4.
-8 -6 -4 -2 2
Figure 4: Airy functions Ai(z) and Bi(z)
The position −η0 of the first maximum of Ai(z) is indicated by a vertical
line segment. The curve for Bi(z) is dashed. Imposing the boundary conditions
P ′(0) = P ′(1) = 0 gives
aAi′[s(x)κ(x)x] + bBi′[s(x)κ(x)x] = 0
aAi′[s(x)κ(x)(x− 1)] + bBi′[s(x)κ(x)(x− 1)] = 0,
so that a non-trivial solution only exists if x is a solution to the ”eigenvalue
equation”:
Ai′[s(x)κ(x)x]Bi′[s(x)κ(x)(x − 1)]−Bi′[s(x)κ(x)x]Ai′[s(x)κ(x)(x − 1)] = 0.
(42)
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Corresponding to a solution x of Eq. (42), we find that the solution (41) can
be written as:
P (x) = (43)
= c(Bi′[s(x)κ(x)x]Ai[s(x)κ(x)(x − x)]−Ai′[s(x)κ(x)x]Bi[s(x)κ(x)(x− x)]),
in which c is determined by the normalisation condition. We found that, al-
though the eigenvalue equation (42) can have many solutions, there will be
at most three that correspond to a distribution (43) with the property that
P (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. For values of A and B in the regions I and II of figure
1, typified by PD- and HD-games, there is only one solution. The distributions
calculated for σ = 0.001, are shown in figure 5.
1
PD
1
HD
Figure 5: Stationary distributions for PD- and HD-games
For the PD-case the parameters are A = 1, B = 2 and x = 0.901. For
the HD-case they are A = −2, B = 1 and x = 0.342. For (A,B) ǫ IV , i.e.,
for Coordination Games, there exist three solutions for this value of σ. The
corresponding distributions are plotted in one picture (figure 6).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2
4
6
8
10
CG
Figure 6: Stationary distributions for CG-game
With A = 2 and B = −1 we find for the average strategies x = 0.118,
x = 0.323 and x = 0.915.
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We now study the behaviour of the solution of (37) and (38) for σ → 0.
First consider the case that |B + (A − B)x| > const, independent of σ. Then
κ(x) = |B+(A−B)xσ |
1/3 → ∞ as σ → 0. From figure 4 it is clear that if s(x) =
sign(B+(A−B)x) = 1, then Bi′[s(x)κ(x)x]→∞, Bi′[s(x)κ(x)(x−1)] remains
bounded and Ai′[s(x)κ(x)x] → 0, as σ → 0. This implies that x can only be a
solution of Eq.(42) if Ai′[s(x)κ(x)(x − 1)] → 0. From figure 4, it then follows
that κ(x)(x−1)→ −η0, where η0 = 1.01879 · · · is the smallest positive solution
of Ai′(−η0) = 0, so that x→ 1 and κ(x)→ |
A
σ |
1/3. More precisely, we have:
x = 1− |
σ
A
|1/3 η0 as σ → 0
This solution is consistent with the assumption s(x) = 1 if and only if A > 0,
as in the Prisoners Dilemma and the Cooperation Game. The corresponding
asymptotic expression for P (x) becomes:
P (x) = cAi[−κ(x)(x − x)] = cAi[(
A
σ
)1/3(1− x)− η0].
Note that for σ → 0 this distribution becomes sharply peaked at x = 1, with
the width of the peak proportional to σ1/3.
By a similar reasoning, it is found that for B < 0 (as in the Cooperation
Game) there exists a solution such that
x = |
σ
B
|1/3 η0 and P (x) = cAi[|
B
σ
|1/3x− η0]
as σ → 0.
In the previous section we found that for σ = 0 the Hawk-Dove Game and
the Cooperation Game have solutions with x = BB−A , which we call a central
solution. This motivates us to look for solutions for which κ(x) = |B+(A−B)xσ |
1/3
remains bounded as as σ → 0. We therefore assume that
x =
B
B −A
+
α
B −A
σ + ... as σ → 0, (44)
where α ∈ R is as yet unknown. Substituting Eq.(44) into Eq.(42) and taking
the limit σ → 0 yields:
Ai′[
B
B −A
α1/3]Bi′[
A
B −A
α1/3]−Bi′[
B
B −A
α1/3]Ai′[
A
B −A
α1/3] = 0, (45)
where α1/3 is understood to mean sign(α)|α|1/3. This is the equation from
which α must be solved. Although Eq.(45) has many zeroes, only one corre-
sponds to a positive distribution given by:
P (x) = c(Bi′[βα1/3]Ai[α1/3(x− β)]−Ai′[βα1/3]Bi[α1/3(x− β)]), (46)
with β = BB−A . For A = −2 and B = 1, (a Hawk-Dove game), it is plotted in
figure 7.
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Figure 7: Asymptotic HD-distribution for σ → 0
We note that Eqs. (45) and (46) are invariant under A → −A, B → −B.
Therefore, as σ → 0, we find the same central solution for the Coordination
Game with A = 2 and B = −1. From numerical simulations we find, however,
that the central solution is stable in the Hawk-Dove Game, but unstable in the
Coordination Game.
Away from the limit σ → 0, we can track the fate of the central solution as σ
grows. Since the full eigenvalue-equation (42) is not invariant under A → −A,
B → −B, the situation is different for Hawk-Dove Games as opposed to Co-
ordination Games. For Hawk-Dove Games, we find that the central solution
persists for all values of the diffusion coefficient σ. However, for Coordination
Games we find that above a critical value σc of σ, the unstable central solution
disappears, together with one of the two stable solutions, leaving only one at-
tracting, stationary solution. When A < |B|, the solution at x = 1 remains,
and when A > |B|, the solution near x = 0 survives. This can be summarised
by saying that for large enough values of σ, the only attracting solution is a
stationary solution near the risk-dominated solution of the discrete equation.
The bifurcation process is illustrated in figure 8,where for two values of σ the
left-hand-side of Eq.(42) is plotted as a function of x(σ). For σ = 0.0035 this
function has three zeroes, whereas for σ = 0.0039 there is only one. This closely
resembles the situation in the discrete case as described in section 2. However,
the critical values for σ in the discrete case and in the continuous case are not
comparable (0.11 vs. 0.0037).
3.3.3 Summary
Here we summarise and compare the results of the three types of games, using
the discrete model, the discrete model with a stochastic term and the continuous
model with deterministic mutation.
The Prisoners Dilemma is straightforward. In the discrete case the popula-
tion will eventually play All Defect. This does not change when the strategy-
space is made continuous and adding deterministic mutation simply changes the
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Figure 8: Bifurcation of CG-games
limiting delta-distribution to a finite peak with width proportional to σ1/3. The
contrast with the corresponding stochastic equation is that there the width of
the peak is narrower and proportional to σ1/2.
In the discrete version of the Coordination Game, the population will even-
tually play either x1 = 0 or x1 = 1, where the final outcome depends on the
intial condition. If the mutation rate is larger than a certain threshhold, only
the stable solution around the risk-dominant solution remains. This result re-
mains the same in the continuous case. Depending on the initial distribution of
strategies, the final distribution will be sharply peaked (width of peak propor-
tional to σ1/3) around either x = 0 or x = 1. When the mutation rate becomes
larger than a critical value, only the distribution around the risk-dominant solu-
tion remains. We note that this critical value is much smaller in the continuous
case than in the discrete case. The stochastic equation has only one, attracting,
stationary solution. When the mutation rate σ is small, this distribution is al-
most completely concentrated around the risk dominant solution, where again
the width of the distribution is proportional to σ1/2.
The Hawk-Dove Game shows the following behaviour. In the discrete case,
there is an asymptotically stable solution for all values of σ > 0, which for
σ = 0 has the value x1 = B/(B − A). The stochastic equation has a unique
attracting stationary solution, peaked around x = B/(B−A) and with a width
proportional to σ1/2. Without mutation, σ = 0, the continuous equation has
an asymptotically stable invariant set of solutions, consisting of all distributions
P (x) with average x = B/(B − A). Depending on the initial distribution,
the solution converges to a member of this set. When the mutation term is
added, σ > 0, only one, attracting, solution remains. In the limit σ → 0,
this solution converges to (46). This solution is not concentrated on a single
point, but has the whole interval [0, 1] as support. Such a solution is sometimes
referred to as polymorphic. For small σ, numerical experiments show that a
starting distribution initially converges to a distribution close to the solution it
would reach if σ = 0, but then slowly (on a time-scale of 1/σ) evolves to the
unique limiting solution. This behaviour resembles that of a singulary perturbed
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ordinary differential equation, which in the unperturbed case has an attracting
set of fixed points, and where after adding the perturbation, the attracting
invariant set survives. In this invariant set we would have, in this analogy, one
attracting fixed point left.
4 The Ultimatum Game
This game has attracted a great deal of interest, mainly as a model to explain
the occurrence of strong reciprocity in populations of supposedly selfish individ-
uals.(Binmore [17], Fehr & Gachter [18]). Here ”strong reciprocity” means the
willingness to share, but also to punish egotistical behaviour in others, even at
a cost to oneself. See Bowles & Gintis [19].
The game is played by two players. The first player is given a certain amount
of money and proposes a split of this money with the second player. This second
player has the choice between accepting the offer, or rejecting it, in which case
neither of the two players will receive anything. An obvious strategy for the
second player is to accept every offer, since something is better than nothing.
Realising this, the first player will maximise his share by offering the lowest
possible amount to the second player. This (combined) strategy is sometimes
referred to as ”the rational solution” (Page & Nowak [20]), ”the subgame-perfect
equilibrium” (Seymour [21]) or the strategy of ”Homo Economicus” (Bowles &
Gintis [22]).
An evolutionary version of this game, taking into account mutations, was
studied in [20] and by Nowak et al. [23], using adaptive dynamics. In adaptive
dynamics models, the population is assumed to always be monomorphic, i.e.,
everybody plays the same strategy. Every now and then, a mutant is introduced.
If the strategy of the mutant is more succesful than the resident strategy, it
will quickly spread in the population, thus becoming the new resident strategy.
For the Ultimatum Game it was found that in the absence of any restrictions,
the solution of the adaptive dynamics model indeed converged to the ”rational
solution”.
The Ultimatum Game was also studied by Seymour [21], using replicator
dynamics. He included mutations as a given, exogeneous term and found that
other solutions can emerge, far from the ”subgame-perfect solution”, depending
on the form and intensity of the mutation function.
We model the Ultimatum Game as follows. The strategy space is S =
[0, 1]× [0, 1], where a stategy s = (x, y) ∈ S means that the player, in the role
of nr. 1, will offer a fraction x, while in the role of nr. 2 he will reject any offer
lower than y.
In one round, the players will play the role of nr. 1 and nr. 2 alternately.
This leads to a payoff function giving the payoff to strategy s when playing
strategy s′ (the factor 1/2 has been omitted):
M(s, s′) =M(x, y|x′, y′) = (1 − x)Θ(x− y′) + x′Θ(x′ − y), (47)
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in which the Heaviside function is defined by
Θ(z) =
{
1 if z ≥ 0
0 if z < 0
(48)
Before writing down the full replicator equation (14) for this case we first
introduce a number of abbreviations:
H(x, t) =
∫ 1
0
P (x, y, t) dy and V (y, t) =
∫ 1
0
P (x, y, t) dx, (49)
which are normalised as∫ 1
0
H(x, t) dx =
∫ 1
0
V (y, t) dy = 1. (50)
Q(x, t) and R(y, t) are defined by
Q(x, t) =
∫ x
0
V (y, t) dy and R(y, t) =
∫ 1
y
xH(x, t) dx, (51)
so that
Q(0, t) = 0 and Q(1, t) = 1 and R(1, t) = 0. (52)
In terms of these functions the local and global averages take the form
Π(x, y, P ) = (1− x)Q(x, t) +R(y, t) (53)
and
Π(P ) = c1(t) + c2(t), (54)
with
c1(t) =
∫ 1
0
(1− x)Q(x, t)H(x, t) dx c2(t) =
∫ 1
0
R(y, t)V (y, t) dy. (55)
At last the replicator equation becomes
∂P (x, y, t)
∂t
= [(1− x)Q(x, t) +R(y, t)− c1(t)− c2(t)]P (x, y, t) + (56)
+σ∆P (x, y, t),
in which ∆ is the two-dimensional Laplace operator. The boundary condition
is
∇P · n = 0 on the boundary. (57)
In what follows we will restrict ourselves to solutions which can be written as
the product of two normalised functions of (x, t) and of (y, t) respectively. It
then necessarily follows that
P (x, y, t) = H(x, t)V (y, t). (58)
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With this restriction we easily show, by integrating Eq.(56) over y, that
∂H(x, t)
∂t
= [(1 − x)Q(x, t)− c1(t)]H(x, t) + σ
∂2H(x, t)
∂x2
. (59)
The boundary conditions are
∂H(x = 0, t)
∂x
=
∂H(x = 1, t)
∂x
= 0 for all t. (60)
Integration over x of Eq.(56) leads to
∂V (y, t)
∂t
= [R(y, t)− c2(t)]V (y, t) + σ
∂2V (y, t)
∂y2
, (61)
with boundary conditions
∂V (y = 0, t)
∂y
=
∂V (y = 1, t)
∂y
= 0 for all t. (62)
We note that for σ = 0 these equations are the same as those studied in [21],
where it is assumed that there are two separate populations of players, one where
all members always play the role of nr. 1 and the other with nr. 2 players.
4.1 The equation without mutation
For σ = 0 the equations become:
∂H(x, t)
∂t
= [(1− x)Q(x, t) − c1(t)]H(x, t)
∂V (y, t)
∂t
= [R(y, t)− c2(t)]V (y, t). (63)
Similar to the Hawk-Dove Game, we identify a set of stationary solutions:
H0(x) = δ(x− x)
V0(y) =
{
v(y) if y < x
0 if y > x
c1 = 1− x , c2 = x (64)
where v(y) is an arbitrary function with
∫ x
0 v(y) dy = 1 and δ(z) is the Dirac-
δ distribution. The solution (64) is easily checked, by noting that R(y) =
xΘ(x− y) and that Q(x) = 1. We have also used z δ(z) ≡ 0. The interpretation
of this solution is clear: player nr. 1 always offers x, so player nr. 2 will always
receive this amount, as long as his acceptence threshhold is below x. The average
payoff is therefore Π = c1 + c2 = 1 and any distribution of the y-values below x
is stationary, given this distribution of x. The limit x → 0 corresponds to the
subgame-perfect solution.
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To show that (64) represents an attracting set of solutions, we use the same
reasoning as in section 3.3.1, and find
exp[
∫ t
0
c1(t
′) dt′] =
∫ 1
0
H0(x) exp[(1 − x)
∫ t
0
Q(x, t′) dt′] dx ≡ h(t) (65)
H(x, t) =
H0(x)
h (t)
exp[(1− x)
∫ t
0
Q(x, t′) dt′] (66)
exp[
∫ t
0
c2(t
′) dt′] =
∫ 1
0
V0(y) exp[
∫ t
0
R(x, t′) dt′] dy ≡ v(t) (67)
V (y, t) =
V0(y)
v(t)
exp[
∫ t
0
R(y, t′) dt′]. (68)
By differentiating Eq. (65) and (67), respectively, we obtain:
c1(t) =
1
h(t)
∫ 1
0
(1− x)Q(x, t)H0(x) exp[(1− x)
∫ t
0
Q(x, t′) dt′] dx (69)
c2(t) =
1
v(t)
∫ 1
0
R(y, t)V0(y) exp[
∫ t
0
R(y, t′) dt′] dy. (70)
Assuming that V (y, t) converges to a stationary distribution (as all numerical
results show), then (1 − x)
∫ t
0
Q(x, t′) dt′ converges to a function with a finite
number of isolated local maxima. One of these, say x = x, is the absolute
maximum, and it follows from Eq.(66) that H(x, t) converges to δ(x−x). From
Eq.(51) it follows that R(y, t) converges to R(y) = xΘ(x − y) and V (y, t) con-
verges to c V0(y)Θ(x − y), with c a normalization constant. From Eq.(55) it
follows that c1(t) converges to 1− x and c2(t) to x.
The above considerations show that if the solution of Eq.(63) converges to a
stationary solution, it must be a member of the invariant set (64). However, the
value of x cannot be predicted from the above formula’s. Numerical solution
of Eq.(63) shows that for random initial distributions of H(x, 0) and V (y, 0) on
the whole interval [0, 1], the functions H(x, t) and V (y, t) indeed approach the
form of Eq.(64) for t → ∞. The average strategy x, based on 100 simulations,
takes values between 0.12 and 0.30, with a mean value equal to 0.22 and a stan-
dard deviation of 0.04.We note that a uniform distribution of both H(x, 0) and
V (y, 0) also leads to a value of x = 0.22.
4.2 The equation with mutation
We have found numerically that when σ > 0, all solutions of the full equations
(59) and (61) tend to a unique solution of the stationary equations:
σ
d2H(x)
dx2
+ [(1− x)Q(x)− c1]H(x) = 0 (71)
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and
σ
d2V (y)
dy2
+ [R(y)− c2]V (y) = 0. (72)
The boundary values are those of Eqs.(60) and(62).
Unfortunately, we have not been able to find closed form expressions for the
solutions of these equations. There are two ways to approximate the stationary
solution, which lead to the same result. First, we numerically solved the full
equations(59) and (61), by discretising space, solving the resulting coupled set
of ordinary differential equations and considering the solution as t→∞. In the
second method, we define the following seven functions
F1(x) = H(x), F2(x) =
dH(x)
dx
, F3(x) = V (x), F4(x) =
dV (x)
dx
,
F5(x) = Q(x), F6(x) = R(x), F7(x) =
∫ 1
x
H(x′) dx′. (73)
In terms of these functions and with k = 1/σ ,the stationary equations can now
be written as
dF1(x)
dx
= F2(x)
dF2(x)
dx
= −k[(1− x)F5(x) − c1]F1(x)
dF3(x)
dx
= F4(x)
dF4(x)
dx
= −k[F6(x) − c2]F3(x) (74)
dF5(x)
dx
= F3(x)
dF6(x)
dx
= −xF1(x)
dF7(x)
dx
= −F1(x)
These equation can be solved numerically by starting the integration from the
following values at x = 1
F1(1) = a, F2(1) = 0, F3(1) = b, F4(1) = 0,
F5(1) = 1, F6(1) = 0, F7(1) = 0, (75)
and using a standard routine to arrive at the values of these functions in x = 0.
The numbers (a,b,c1,c2) are as yet unknown. They should be chosen in such a
way that the boundary conditions at x = 0 be satisfied, i.e.,
(F2(0), F4(0), F5(0), F7(0)) = (0, 0, 0, 1). (76)
This matching of four numbers by varying four other numbers should be possible
in many ways. It turns out, however, that the requirement of positivity of F1(x)
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and F3(x) in the whole interval [0, 1] makes the solution unique. A root finding
routine of Mathematica does the job. For σ = 0.001 the stationary solutions
H(x) and V (y) are shown in figure 9.
1
H
1
V
Figure 9: Stationary solution of Eqs.(71) and (72) for σ = 0.001
We note that H(x) has a Gauss-like distribution around a mean value x =
0.3172, while V (y) is approximated by the right half of a Gaussian, with its
maximum at y = 0. For smaller values of σ, the value of x(σ) and the width of
the peak of the H(x)-distribution decrease, but the shape of the distributions
is otherwise unchanged.
For values of σ down to 10−9 we have calculated the σ-dependence of x. In
figure 10
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Figure 10: Log-log plot of x as function of σ
a log-log plot of this dependence is shown. A good fit of the data points is
given by x(σ) ≈ 1.64× σ0.23.
The numerical solution of the full time dependent equations reveals a dynam-
ical pattern similar to the Hawk-Dove Game of section 2. Initially a distribution
approaches the attracting set (64), after which it slowly converges to the unique
stationary solution, on a time-scale of 1/σ .
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have generalised the replicator dynamics of games with de-
terministic mutations, as described in [4], to the situation where players have
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access to a continuous strategy space. The resulting equation (14) has a well
defined solution, which, however, is not easy to analyse in general.
Our first example, the continuous version of 2× 2 symmetric games, already
illustrates a number of interesting and perhaps unexpected features of this equa-
tion. Although there is no a priori reason to believe that the continuous and
the discrete strategy version of the same 2 × 2 game have anything to do with
each other, the similarities between some results warrant our surprise at the
differences in others. The continuous Prisoners Dilemma and the Coordination
Game behave similar to their discrete case counterparts: the final state is a
monomorphic distribution, where every player in the population plays one of
the two pure strategies. The extension to a continuous strategy space and the
inclusion of mutation (which has the form of a diffusion term) only leads to
the existence of small variations around the single peak of the final distribution.
Also in the continuous Coordination Game we encounter, as in the discrete case,
a threshold value for the mutation term separating a regime with two attracting
solutions from one where only a single attractor exists.
The difference occurs in the Hawk-Dove game. In the discrete version there
is a stable equilibrium with Hawks and Doves coexisting. In the continuous ver-
sion this does not translate into a monomorphic distribution around the mixed
strategy corresponding to this equilibrium. Rather, in the unique limiting dis-
tribution the whole range of mixed strategies from pure Hawk to pure Dove
is represented. The attraction to this stationary solution occurs on two time
scales. On a fast time scale, the solution is attracted to the set of distributions
with average corresponding to the equilibrium mixed strategy of the discrete
case. Then, on a slow time scale proportional to the inverse of the mutation
rate, the solution converges to the unique attractor. This two timescales phe-
nomenon was observed in numerical simulations, and is currently awaiting a
more thorough analysis. Also, there are many interesting games with three or
more strategies (for instance Rock, Scissors, Paper) of which the continuous
version can hold more surprises.
The results of the second example, the Ultimatum Game, are of great inter-
est to the debate around strong reciprocity and how it could have evolved. Our
model shows that replicator dynamics and a small mutation term can lead to
a final outcome far from the subgame-perfect solution. Take, for instance, a
mutation rate of 10−3. So in every time-interval, all players vary their strategies
according to the cold rules of self-interest, after which a small fraction of 0.1%
of the population, change their strategy just a little bit. Then we find that an
initial population consisting almost entirely of cynical misers (accept everything
and offer nothing), eventually turns into a world where the average offer is more
than 30%!
This surprising result can be explained in the following way. Consider a
situation where all proposers offer only a small share to their opponent and
these opponents all have an acceptance threshhold lower than this offer. Now,
due to mutation, some acceptors will demand a share that is slightly larger than
what is being offered. Normally, this would be a suicidal strategy. However,
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also due to mutation, there will be amongst the proposers a small set who are
willing to offer slightly more than their colleagues. On the one hand, these
fairer-minded proposers earn slightly less from the bulk of the acceptors, but on
the other hand they are the only ones to profit from the small group of high-
minded mutants on the acceptor-side. The net result can be that the second
effect dominates and that there will be a tendency towards higher offers.
For sufficiently small mutation rates the dynamics of the Ultimatum Game
show the same structure with two timescales as the continuous Hawk-Dove
game. An initial distribution is quickly attracted to a distribution where the
offers are sharply peaked, and then slowly converges to the unique stationary
solution.
In this case too, a more rigorous mathematical analysis is required for a
better understanding of the model. In particular it would be nice to be able
to calculate the value of the exponent in the formula relating the mutation
rate and the average value of the offers, which in this paper we derived from
numerical simulations. For this purpose singular perturbation theory seems to
be an appropriate tool. Furthermore, we have only considered mutation rates
that are the same for the proposers as for the acceptors. Differentiating between
these may also lead to a fuller understanding.
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